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The discursive construction of climate change adaptation as a policy issue gives rise to material 
practices that have real effects on people‘s lives, and should thus be critically interrogated. In the 
realm of adaptation policies, the Nordic countries have been at the forefront, but for Icelandic 
decision-makers the topic remains relevantly novel. This study aimed to reveal how Reykjavík 
municipality and the Government of Iceland represent adaptation as a problem and where their 
policies and policy suggestions lead to. This was achieved through the use of Bacchi‘s „What‘s the 
Problem Represented to be?“ approach to discourse analysis, where policy documents and 
interviews were collected and scrutinized. The results show that Icelandic policymakers are leaning 
towards technocratic adaptation pathways that privilege experts, prioritize responses to biophysical 
risk, safeguard neoliberal values, and suggest that adaptive capacity can be achieved through 
modifications to the status quo. This is highly problematic given that such approaches ignore the 
societal dimensions of climate change, give rise to short-term thinking, and downplay the need for 
more transformative change. Furthermore, they have been shown to exasperate existing 
vulnerabilities, reinforce social inequalities, and lead to maladaptive outcomes. However, the 
presence of a supplementary sociosystemic conceptualization of adaptation in Icelandic policy 
discourses suggests the possibility to reframe the issue as a matter of social transformation, which 
is what numerous scholars are now calling for.   
Keywords: Climate change adaptation, policy discourse, risk, problematization, What’s the Problem 
Represented to be?, Reykjavík municipality, Government of Iceland.  
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At the onset of 2020, devastating effects of climate change are unfolding before our 
very eyes. The list of alarming events and warning signs can hardly be ignored; 
with reports of recent bushfires in Australia at a massive scale (McGrath, 2020), 
broken heat records in the Arctic (Watts, 2020), and a global health crisis in the 
light of a new coronavirus pandemic. Research has firmly established by now that 
climate change inflicts more severe weather (Shi et al., 2016). Iceland, a small 
island nation in the North Atlantic, is no exception to this trend. Several extreme 
weather events have struck the country in recent times, as reported in local 
newspapers (Daðason, 2020; Morgunblaðið, 2020), with coastal cyclones and 
floods that have caused extensive damage and distress. 
 
As the once projected ramifications of climate change begin to materialize, the need 
for adaptive measures grows ever more apparent. Policymakers around the world 
are waking up to the reality that a multitude of severe effects caused by climate 
change, both current and projected, will not be mitigated, even if all emissions were 
to stop today (IPCC, 2018). Climate change adaptation has, accordingly, acquired 
an increased presence in the policy agendas of wealthier countries; but in its 
infancy, the issue was mostly understood as a concern for less developed countries, 
which were expected to experience more severe impacts of climate change (Pelling, 
2011), and was widely seen as a „defeatist“ option (Persson, 2019, p. 2). As a term, 
climate change adaptation is quite broad and is yet to acquire a widely recognized 
definition (Remling, 2018). However, it is generally seen as „the process of 
adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects“ (IPCC 2014, p. 5).  
 
In conjunction with these developments, the need arises to critically address how 
political decision-makers conceptualize adaptation and develop policies to tackle 
the issue accordingly. From the viewpoint of constructivist inquiry, social 
problems, and issues that reach the political agenda do not exist independently „out 
there“ but are discursively constituted (Bacchi, 1999). As such, it must be 
recognized that how a problem is represented as a policy issue is not untinged by 
relations of power and competing forms of rationalities. The discursive 
constructions of matters such as adaptation to climate change should be understood 
as productive since they lead to a range of material practices that exclude alternative 
ways of knowing and doing.  
1. Introduction  
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Proponents of discourse analysis have firmly established the necessity of 
investigating how words and ideas manifest real practices (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002). For instance, Goodwin (2011) argues that „discourse within a public policy 
framework provides legitimacy for government ideology.” (p. 23). If this is true, 
then policies can become tools of social control and system maintenance, when the 
meanings that support them remain unquestioned. The way forward then, and the 
path to more socially just outcomes, must be to critically scrutinize policy 
discourses, reveal what they ignore and show what effects they have on people’s 
lives (Bacchi, 1999). 
 
In the study at hand I first aim to examine how Reykjavík Municipality and the 
Government of Iceland discursively construct adaptation as a problem. Secondly, I 
aim to unveil and interrogate the implicit trade-offs and unspoken issues that follow 
these problem representations. To my best knowledge, Icelandic policies and policy 
suggestions that consider climate change adaptation have never been critically 
scrutinized before; and I intend to address this gap in the literature. Prior studies 
that deal with the discursive construction of adaptation in policy agendas, both in 
local and national contexts, have revealed a range of problematic assumptions and 
taken-for-granted knowledges which delimit conceptions of how adaptation is to be 
governed (Remling, 2018), who‘s knowledge and expertise counts (Ensor et al., 
2019), which groups are most vulnerable to climate change (Löf, 2013) and what 
spatio-temporal limitations adaptation presents (Solan et al., 2020). 
1.1. Background of study 
The Nordic countries have been at the forefront of adaptation, with Finland 
introducing a national adaptation policy in 2005, and Norway and Denmark 
following suit in 2008 (Björnsson et al., 2018; The Danish Government, 2008). 
Iceland is, by contrast, lagging behind its Nordic neighbors when it comes to the 
formulation of policies regarding climate adaptation (Björnsson et al., 2018). The 
issue has not featured strongly in the political agenda of Iceland and the government 
is yet to present any official policies that deal with it (ibid.). However, following a 
scientific report published in 2018, which strongly urged policymakers to take 
adaptation into consideration (ibid.), the Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources announced that the process of planning for climate adaptation had 
commenced (Alþingi, 2020).  
 
The Icelandic Climate Council, which brings together actors from the scientific 
community, government, and businesses, has been tasked with doing the 
groundwork and preparing policy suggestions (Sigurðsson, 2020). Its first steps 
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were to host workshops and conferences on climate adaptation where relevant 
actors - representatives of NGOs, state agencies, municipalities, and universities - 
were brought together in order to generate knowledge and insights that might 
inform future policy decisions (Icelandic Association of Local Authorities, 2019). 
Subsequently, the Climate Council published a discussion paper in January 2020, 
listing out suggestions to be reviewed and considered (Sigurðsson, 2020). However, 
the question remains how long it will take before an official adaptation policy is put 
forth. In the present political vacuum, where roles and responsibilities concerning 
the prevention of and responses to potentially harmful effects of climate change are 
left undefined, Reykjavík Municipality remains the only local authority that has 
introduced its own adaptation policy (Reykjavík Municipality, 2016).  
 
The present state of adaptation as a policy issue in Iceland underscores the need to 
address it at the discursive level, especially given that a national policy for 
adaptation is underway. There are a few reasons why both Reykjavík Municipality 
and the Icelandic Government are under investigation in this study. First off, the 
responsibilities between local and national authorities have not been defined, but 
there is reason to believe that the government will establish and oversee an 
overarching framework for adaptation that municipalities have the autonomy to 
implement in a way they see best fit (Sigurðsson, 2020). Also, given the fact that 
Reykjavík has spearheaded the agenda of adaptation in Iceland, the Government 
seems somewhat informed by the municipality‘s policies, with the Climate Council 
repeatedly referring to them in its work on adaptation (ibid.). 
1.2. Research questions 
The following research questions draw upon Bacchi‘s What‘s the Problem 
Represented to be? approach to discourse analysis, which is further elaborated upon 
in the theory chapter. 
 
How is adaptation discursively constructed by Icelandic policymakers at both the 
municipal and national levels?  
1. How is adaptation problematized? Which are the solutions proposed? 
What is presented as the correct, desirable, or logical way to adapt?  
2. What underlying assumptions underpin policy and policy 
recommendations? Which conceptual logics are operationalized in order to 
support claims?  
3. What silences can be detected? What remains unproblematized in the 
representation?  
12 
 
 
2.1. Theory 
2.1.1. What’s the Problem Represented to be? 
Discourse analysis emerged from the constructivist research paradigm and is 
therefore underscored by the view that meaning and understanding are constructed 
through social interaction; contesting the realist perspective that an objective 
comprehension of our world can be reached through empirical examination 
(Creswell and Creswell, 2018). Through the constructivist understanding of 
meaning-making, science is not a value-free domain, since what we consider as 
“facts” and common sense is seen as socially constructed within given cultural and 
historical settings; and can thus work in the favor of certain groups. From this 
epistemological viewpoint, one of the main endeavors of research becomes to 
question and challenge what is presented as self-evident through the analysis of 
discourse. However, it should be noted that there is no single definition of 
discourse, but Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 2) describe it as “a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world (or as aspect of the world).” In this study, 
I follow Bacchi‘s (1999) definition of discourse as „the language, concepts and 
categories employed to frame an issue.“ (p. 2). Discourse analysis has materialized 
as a family of critical approaches, which are not always in agreement, but Feindt 
and Oels (2005) argue that they are all; 1) highly skeptical towards objective truths 
and perceive all knowledge as contestable, 2) recognize that language has a role in 
constituting policies and procedures, and 3) understand that knowledge and 
language play a role in shaping power relations.   
 
One such approach, which is particularly adept at the analysis of policy, is Bacchi’s 
“What’s the Problem Represented to Be?” (WPR), which places the process of 
problematization into view. According to Bacchi (1999), who draws her ideas from 
Foucauldian discourse theory and Derrida’s method of deconstruction, we are not 
actually governed through policies but rather through problematizations; since the 
way social problems are constructed will narrow the scope down to certain solutions 
and leave other potential avenues of action undiscovered. Bacchi (1999) stresses 
2. Research design 
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that the social problems that policies intend to remedy need to be scrutinized, since 
their representation can work in the favour of more powerful actors and often 
produces material and “lived” effects, such as the constitution of subjects and 
reproduction of practices, that are potentially harmful and could be avoided. This 
way, problem representations presented as “common sense” can become tools in 
the service of power; which is problematic given the near-hegemonic position of 
problem-solving, as opposed to problem-questioning, in today’s society (ibid.).  
 
To facilitate the interrogation of policy discourses, Bacchi (2009, p. 2) has 
formulated six questions to ask of the material that has been chosen for analysis: 
1. What’s the ‘problem’ (e.g. of ‘problem gamblers’, ‘drug use/abuse’, 
domestic violence, global warming, health inequalities, terrorism, etc.) 
represented to be in a specific policy? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 
‘problem’? 
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? 
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the 
silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought of differently? 
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, 
disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and 
replaced? 
 
With these questions, Bacchi provides researchers with a tangible method; 
something which is left out of many approaches to discourse analysis, such as 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory which is also rooted in Foucauldian 
philosophy (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). She describes WPR as, essentially, a 
Derridian method of deconstruction, where the analyst works backwards through 
three steps described as „(1) reflect upon the shape of claims made about social 
problems; (2) consider the implications which flow from the shape of these claims; 
and (3) reflect upon what is missing from the shape of some claims and what 
implications follow from this“ (Bacchi 1999, p. 59). Through such efforts, one goes 
beyond the level of mere description. In the words of Kriznik (2015), it allows „the 
researcher to actively question how the problem under investigation contributes to 
the particular “mentality of government” present at specific points in time” (p. 63). 
From this, it can be understood that what, in fact, proves the overarching goal of 
Bacchi’s form of discourse analysis is to interrogate the complex and often layered 
motivations that lie behind policy. In this context, government is seen as a 
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privileged actor that presents certain problem representations in order to safeguard 
self-interests which go beyond simply preserving authority (Bacchi, 1999). 
However, Bacchi also acknowledges that discourses often work at the unconscious 
level, and therefore such efforts are not always intentional. This treatment of 
intentionality should be considered a pivotal element of her reasoning since it opens 
up the possibility for transformation. If conditions are created where decision-
makers, and society at large, are able to reflect better upon their own understanding, 
as opposed to passively accepting ideas that have been stripped of their political 
value and cast as objective truths, more transformative and just policies might 
follow.  
 
2.1.2. Central concepts 
The Foucauldian concepts of problematization and governmentality are central to a 
WPR analysis and will, therefore, be elaborated upon here. Foucault, in the latter 
part of his career, described his work as, essentially, studies of “forms of 
problematizations” (Frederiksen et al., 2015). Problematization is a term that 
encompasses how problems are conceptualized, discussed, and resolved in society 
(Foucault, 1984), and Foucault considered it to be one of the primary instruments 
used to implement and sustain liberal rationality (Bacchi, 1999). This way, and as 
Bacchi (1999) argues, there is a direct link between problematization and 
governmentality, in that governmentality is a term that denotes “government 
rationality” or the structures of thought that government relies upon.  
 
Bacchi’s ideas also correlate with Stanley Deetz’s concepts of systematically 
distorted communication and discursive closure. Deetz (1992) considers 
communication to be systematically distorted when ways of doing, thinking, and 
even being, are steadily reproduced without the possibility to present critique. He 
regards systematic distortion as rarely, if ever, premeditated by individuals and 
rather sees it as structural inertia (ibid.); which is similar to how Bacchi (1999) 
treats discourses. Furthermore, the ideas of Deetz (1992) relate to Bacchi’s notion 
of silences, since he contends that systematically distorted communication leads to 
the exclusion of alternative forms of knowledges, arguing that "When discussion is 
thwarted, a particular view of reality is maintained at the expense of equally 
plausible ones, usually to someone's advantage" (p. 188). Systematic distortion 
gives rise to what Deetz (1992) calls discursive closure, which “exists whenever 
potential conflict is suppressed” (187). Such discursive closures occlude alternative 
views but, on the contrary, moments of discursive openings, which present the 
opportunity for transformation, can also appear at any given time (Christensen et 
al., 2015).  
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2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. Data selection criteria 
When analyzing policy, the width of relevant material should first be established. 
Goodwin’s (2011) definition of policy analysis sets a broad scope; it can include 
the investigation of political text, decisions, statements, speeches, process, 
interviews, and other interactions. The WPR approach (Bacchi, 2012) has a wide 
field of application but “specific pieces of legislation or policy pronouncements 
provide the most obvious starting points for analysis” (p. 23). This view is 
presumably founded on the idea that such documents provide clear clues of how 
the problem is constructed and represented in official policy. However, Bacchi 
(2012) also acknowledges that “more general government documents also contain 
implicit problem representations” (p. 23) and that material from the science 
community, such as “theoretical and postulated solutions” (p. 23), is also relevant 
within the WPR approach.  
 
Bacchi has made several “updates” and modifications to her approach since it was 
first introduced in 1999. In 2012, she stated that the WPR approach should, in fact, 
be viewed as a more “openended mode of critical engagement, rather than as a 
formula” (Bacchi, p. 23). This presents researchers with the opportunity to adjust 
the approach to better suit their inquiry; which could help enable a heightened 
sensitivity towards the political, cultural, and historical aspects of the specific 
research settings. Other scholars also endorse such refinements to discourse 
analytical approaches; Jørgensen and Phillips’s (2002) account of discourse 
analysis stresses that “it is possible to create one’s own package by combining 
elements from different discourse analytical perspectives and, if appropriate, non-
discourse analytical perspectives” (p. 4). Furthermore, they argue that such multi-
perspectival work is “positively valued in most forms of discourse analysis” (ibid., 
p. 4). 
 
My study built upon Bacchi‘s suggested material selection and relied mostly upon 
the analysis of selected policy documents, reports, and speeches that deal with 
climate change adaptation and are produced by governance actors at either the 
municipal or national level. In addition, I collected two interviews with key actors; 
Reykjavík Municipality‘s Climate Change Commissioner, who led the process of 
formulating Reykjavíks Climate Policy, and the Chairman of the Icelandic Climate 
Council, who is currently leading the process of formulating suggestions for 
Iceland‘s first adaptation policy. At a later stage in the analytical process, I added a 
third interview where I spoke to the politician who is currently leading the process 
of formulating Iceland‘s first food policy, in order to further explore a preliminary 
insight. 
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The data collection followed the following selection criteria: 
1. Documents must reflect the official discourse. As such, they should be 
produced by actors who are, or were at the time, involved in the process of 
formulating policy or policy suggestions for Reykjavík Municipality or the 
Government of Iceland. This is due to the fact that the WPR approach 
considers everyone directly involved in the policy process as actors that 
partake in shaping the problem representation (Bacchi, 1999). The same 
goes for the selection of interview informants, but they should, preferably, 
be key actors in the policy process – who can provide a more in-depth 
understanding of the rationale behind the policies.  
2. The document selection must span from the point in which adaptation was 
first featured on the policy agendas of Reykjavík Municipality and the 
Icelandic Government to the most recent material in which it is discussed.  
 
In relation to data selection, it should also be mentioned that the interview 
respondents, who were all addressed in their capacity as civil servants, are seen as 
reflecting the official discourse of Reykjavík Municipality and the Government of 
Iceland. However, it was also acknowledged that there might be moments of 
discursive opening where the respondents speak from an individual standpoint, and 
not as civil servants, thereby reflecting their own personal opinions.  
 
2.2.2. Documents 
The following tables describe the documents which were selected and analyzed in 
this study. The range of policy material on adaptation in Iceland is relatively scarce 
since the issue reached the political agenda relatively late in comparison to other 
Nordic countries.  They were obtained through the use of online search engines, the 
websites of Icelandic authorities, and email correspondences with civil servants, 
where I asked for textual documents that involve climate adaptation.  
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Reykjavík Municipality  
Title Taskforce report 
on adaptation to 
climate change. 
Reykjavík’s 
Climate Policy. 
Overview of the 
biggest risk 
factors due to 
climate change 
in Reykjavík, 
ways to adapt 
and the current 
situation. 
Measures for the 
adaptation to 
climate change. 
Type Report Policy 
pronouncement 
Report Proposal of 
adaptation 
measures to be 
signed by the 
City Council 
Date November 24th, 
2015. 
June 30th, 2016 September 28th, 
2017 
December 20th, 
2017 
Code DOC 1 DOC 2 DOC 3 DOC 4 
Author  Reykavík 
Municipality‘s 
climate 
adaptation 
taskforce 
Reykjavík 
Municipality 
Reykjavík 
Municipality 
and Alta 
Consultancy 
The Mayor of 
Reykjavík 
No. of pages 31 11 32 3 
 
 
The Icelandic Government  
Title Opening speech 
at the Climate 
Council‘s 
conference on 
adaptation. 
Workshop on 
adaptation. 
Summary of 
the Icelandic 
Climate 
Council‘s 
workshop on 
adaptation to 
climate 
change. 
Parliamentary 
speech on 
adaptation. 
Preparing for a 
changed world. 
Adaptation to 
climate risk 
through policy 
and governance. 
Type Speech Report, 
summary of 
workshop  
Parliamentary 
speech 
Discussion 
paper 
Date May 16th, 2019 May 29th, 2019 November 25th, 
2019 
January, 2020 
Code DOC 6 DOC 7 DOC 8 DOC 9 
Author The Minister of 
Environment 
and Natural 
Resources 
The Climate 
Council and Alta 
Consultancy 
The Minister of 
Environment 
and Natural 
Resources 
The Climate 
Council 
No. of pages 3 14 2 68 
Table 1: Documents from Reykjavík municipality  
Table 2: Documents from the Government of Iceland 
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2.2.3. Interviews 
I conducted three interviews with the following respondents: 1) Reykjavík’s 
Climate Change Commissioner (DOC 5), 2) The Chairman of the Climate Council 
(DOC 10), and 3) the politician who is currently leading the process of formulating 
Iceland’s first food policy (DOC 11). They were performed after a preliminary 
analysis of the gathered documents had been made. This allowed me to pay 
particular attention to whether any categories or themes detected in the documents 
reappeared in the interviews. In this sense, the interviews were conducted in order 
to explore and better understand these themes and the forms of knowledge which 
governance officials rely upon when describing adaptation. The first two interviews 
were conducted in a semi-structured manner and followed a predefined interview 
guide (see appendix 1). The semi-structured method entails some level of protocol 
but also a degree of flexibility and space for improvisation (Silverman, 2014), 
which allowed me to explore what I set out to investigate but also to be open to new 
discoveries and insights. The third interview, also conducted in a semi-structured 
manner, was added at a later stage, in order to follow up on a preliminary insight 
and explore whether and how adaptation is considered in the formulation of a 
national food policy.  
 
During all interviews, I avoided bringing up the insights that I had achieved from 
the preliminary analysis of the documents but rather sought to pose questions that 
revealed how the informants defined problems, solutions, and what they consider 
as „givens“ in relation to adaptation. 
 
2.2.4. Analytical framework 
The following method of analysis was applied to the gathered material: 
1. Revealing how adaptation to climate change is problematized by 
Reykjavík municipality and the Government of Iceland was the starting 
point for analysis. At this stage I followed Bacchi‘s first step of 
deconstruction, and reflected „upon the shape of claims made about social 
problems“ (1999, p. 59). According to her, this can be achieved by placing 
a focus upon what „appears to be givens“ (Bacchi, 1999, p. 35). I focused 
my attention towards how adaptation is described and defined, what is 
presented as problematic or unwanted and which solutions are proposed. 
Through this interrogation, my objective was to go beyond the level of 
description; according to Kriznik (2015), the analyst should at this stage 
be concerned with “the identification and examination of structures of 
thought and the forms of knowledge used to make an object knowable” (p. 
69).  
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2. The second stage of analysis was to uncover and deconstruct the 
underlying assumptions that underpin the problem representation through 
the examination of the conceptual logics and political rationalities present 
in the material. Conceptual logic, as a term, stems from Foucault’s 
archaeological method and can be defined as any form of assertion made 
in order to validify the problem representation (Bacchi, 2009). At this 
stage, I considered “the implications which flow from the shape of these 
claims“ (Bacchi, 1999, p. 59). To unveil the different conceptual logics at 
work, I concentrated my attention on the detection and analysis of 
“binaries, concepts and categories” in the material; as is recommended by 
Bacchi (2009, p. 26).  
3. At the third stage of deconstruction, I aimed to reveal and interrogate 
silences, or what official conceptualizations of adaptation leave 
unproblematized, and consider what implications they have. Here, I went 
through the material again and looked for issues that are downplayed or 
left unaddressed. According to Bacchi (1999), problem representations 
and the forms of knowledge which support them make certain solutions 
possible and preferable while making others seem frivolous or 
inconceivable. As such, silences can be discovered by viewing the 
problem representations and determine what the forms of knowledge that 
support them rule out or render invisible.  
 
2.2.5. Analytical process 
The process of analysis took on an iterative form, where I repeatedly revisited the 
data with emerging insights and understandings in mind. An iterative analysis is 
”key to sparking insight and developing meaning” (Srivastava and Hopwood 2009, 
p. 77) and the repeated processes it entails allows the analyst to be highly reflexive 
and should ultimately lead to more refined understandings. This is also in line with 
Bacchi’s (1999) description of WPR as a highly layered form of analysis, which 
requires repeated application of the research questions in mind.  
 
First, I read through the material and highlighted sentences according to the 
analytical framework previously described; looking for moments in the text which 
reveal the problem representation, underlying assumptions, and silences. From 
there I arranged the coded sentences into an Excel sheet, read through them again, 
and established key concepts, themes, and categories. Subsequently, I revisited the 
data with these emerging insights in mind to further develop them. This cycle of 
analysis was repeated numerous times until it stopped producing new and relevant 
insights and I sensed that a rigorous set of findings had been developed. 
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2.2.6. Positionality and limitations 
A WPR analysis is a practice that goes beyond the identification of varying 
interpretations of the same issue; according to Bacchi (1999) it is imperative to also 
evaluate them. This, she argues, is essential since problem representations lead to 
outcomes that have real effects on people‘s lives, and these effects „need to be 
commented upon and assessed“ (ibid., p. 54). From Bacchi‘s (1999) perspective, 
constructionist researchers cannot avoid political assessment and she argues that 
„The view that all we have in the world of public policy are competing framings of 
problems is, I would argue, a species of pluralism which supports the status quo.“ 
(p. 57). Given this, it becomes clear that how a WPR analysis is carried out is 
inextricably linked with the values and world-view of the analyst. Every part of the 
process, down to the selection of policy texts (Goodwin, 2011), should thus be seen 
as interpretive acts; which is why it is essential to discuss positionality. As such, I 
would like to disclose my contention that adaptation pathways that aim to preserve 
the societal systems in place are gravely insufficient. In my view, neoliberal ideals 
and  growth-oriented economic models are inherently incompatible with a 
sustainable and climate-resilient future where the planetary boundaries are not 
surpassed. The way forward, then, and the answer to the dire environmental crises 
that humanity now faces, must involve challenging the systems that sustain these 
values. This view is not only based in my own experiences working with 
environmental questions but also derives from the growing body of literature that 
argues for wide-reaching systemic change in the face of climate change (Pelling, 
2011; O‘Brien, 2018; Remling, 2018; Nightingale et al., 2020).  
 
Other limitations to this study include the fact that the policy texts and the 
interviews conducted were originally in Icelandic. I‘ve translated the data into 
English and this process always entails the risk that some meanings become lost or 
obscured. In addition to that, it should also be noted that climate change adaptation 
is still a relatively new and emerging policy field in Iceland, with Reykjavík‘s 
adaptation policy being the only concrete policy pronouncement available. The 
governmental data gathered, which mostly consists of reports, speeches, and policy 
suggestions, should, however, provide clues regarding what the upcoming national 
adaptation policy will entail, how the Government represents adaptation, and which 
courses-of-action it sees as favorable.  
 
There are also some ethical implications to consider with regards to my study. 
Silverman (2014) argues that any research that fails to give interviewees enough 
information to base an informed consent upon is carried out under false pretenses 
and should thus be deemed unethical. However, this can in certain situations pose 
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a dilemma since full disclosure can lead participants to change or modify their 
responses (ibid.). From an ethical standpoint, this is quite the balancing act, but I 
made sure to approach my informants with a detailed account of my study without 
revealing that problem representation was the central object of analysis. In addition, 
I acquired consent before recording the interviews and made the informants aware 
that they would be able to retract their responses at any time. The informants did 
not express the overt request to remain anonymous, but in this written document I 
refer to them not by name but rather by professional role.  
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3.1. Discursive construction of adaptation as a problem 
3.1.1. Reykjavík: A problem of spatial planning 
The data reveals that Reykjavík Municipality treats adaptation mainly as a problem 
of spatial planning and infrastructure. The city‘s Climate Policy includes two points 
on adaptation. It stipulates that; 1) the main risk factors are to be mapped out and 
implemented into spatial planning and a strategy for risk mitigation developed, and 
2) nature-based drainage solutions are to be implemented and other nature-based 
and technical solutions employed as flood defenses (DOC 2, p. 7). Furthermore, the 
majority of policy suggestions developed before and after the policy was formed, 
revolve around solutions that can be implemented through Reykjavík‘s Municipal 
Plan or regulations imposed upon the building sector. Such solutions include 
making adaptation a prerequisite for the spatial planning of coastal and harbor areas 
(DOC 1), imposing a minimum floor height for buildings in close proximity to the 
ocean (DOC 3) and regulating the placement of electricity boards and key piping 
so that they are not placed below estimated flood height (DOC 4). The stated goal 
of such measures, and what seems to be the general objective of Reykjavík‘s 
adaptation activities, is to build resilience so that the city is able to withstand the 
threats posed by climate change (DOC 3).   
 
In a report that summarizes the biggest risk factors linked with climate change in 
Reykjavík (DOC 3), it is argued that „Spatial planning is one the most effective 
ways to respond to the biggest risks posed by climate change.“ (p. 29), and the 
findings overall do support this emphasis; spatial planning, Reykjavík‘s Municipal 
Plan and infrastructure are key concepts that span across the material. Using 
nature-based, technical, and policy solutions in spatial planning is arguably the 
primary way in which Reykjavík Municipality intends to perform adaptation and 
manage the biggest climatic threats; which are broadly defined as sea-level rise and 
the increased intensity of precipitation (DOC 3, DOC 5). The account of 
3. Results 
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Reykjavík‘s Climate Change Commissioner (DOC 5) also confirm this 
conceptualization of adaptation; 
„Precipitation and sea-level rise are clearly the biggest factors to consider. Perhaps precipitation 
to a larger degree even. Those are issues that I think we are well on our way with.“ 
 
„But the thing is, that adaptation to climate change is largely a matter of spatial planning. So it 
is an issue that belongs to the Council of Planning and Transportation and not just the Council 
of Environment and Health.“  
 
However, it should also be mentioned that a few of the measures proposed by 
Reykjavík are not related to spatial planning or infrastructure. In the documents 
published after the Climate Policy was formed, solutions to preserve biodiversity 
and to deal with the potential threats posed by invasive species are introduced (DOC 
3, DOC 4). Furthermore, the necessity of developing measures to monitor and 
estimate the effects that ocean acidification could inflict upon Icelandic fish 
populations is briefly addressed (DOC 4) and also the opportunities that could be 
seized with the increased growth of vegetation and forests which is projected in 
conjunction with climate change (DOC 4). 
 
3.1.2. The Icelandic Government: A problem of risk 
management 
The analysis shows that the Icelandic Government represents climate change 
adaptation as, essentially, a problem of managing external risk with high levels of 
uncertainty and complexity attached. This problematization is revealed through 
discursive constructions that cast adaptation as a procedure where scientific 
evidence and risk calculus are skillfully applied in decision-making. The 
conceptualization of adaptation as risk management is well demonstrated in the 
following passage from the Climate Council‘s recently published discussion paper 
(DOC 9);  
„Measures depend upon observations on one hand, and assesment on the other. These fields 
form the process of adaptation which can be defined as risk management, and entails processes 
that either decrease, prevent or distribute the risk of damage caused by climate change.“ (p. 
13). 
 
The governmental material does indeed display a strong orientation towards 
processes that regard the identification of and response to risk. Most of the policy 
suggestions put forth address how a national framework for adaptation is to be 
developed  (DOC 6, DOC 7, DOC 10), how risk is to be defined, assessed and 
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monitored (DOC 6, DOC 8, DOC 9), and how solutions are to be prioritized and 
procedures developed accordingly (DOC 7, DOC 9). This form of adaptation 
framework, which is taking shape at the national level, is justified with the promise 
that the inherent complexity and uncertainty of climate change can be remedied to 
an extent, through the detection of risk and subsequent development of responses 
(DOC 8, DOC 9). The posited outcome of such efforts is a climate-resilient society 
(DOC 6, DOC 8, DOC 9). As with Reykjavík Municipality, resilience was 
identified as a key concept across the governmental material, and the Minister of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DOC 6) stated in a speech that; 
 „On one hand adaptation measures are about increasing research and monitoring of 
vulnerabilities in society, and on the other hand they are about implementing actions that 
increase the resilience of society and the economy.“ 
 
The Climate Council‘s discussion paper is intended to inform the upcoming 
formulation of a national adaptation policy (DOC 9). It brings forth a multitude of 
issues, which are seen as necessary considerations in relation to adaptation. But in 
its concluding chapters the scope is narrowed down and the following categories of 
policy suggestions are directed towards the government; 1) to form a framework 
for national adaptation strategies, 2) to promote coordination between different 
fields of research, 3) to promote collaboration between different actors and 
stakeholders around adaptation, 4) to evaluate laws and regulations with regards to 
adaptation, and 5) to establish monitoring, re-evaluation and assessment of 
adaptation solutions (DOC 9, p. 55-57). These suggestions are founded in the 
representation of adaptation as a problem of identifying and managing risk; which 
is why it is considered essential to establish a feedback-loop of procedures in which 
a broad range of actors and stakeholders collaborate to minimize complexity and 
uncertainty. This corresponds with how adaptation is defined in the same document, 
where it is seen as „characterized by repeated processes, where societies evaluate 
the current situation, future effects, make decisions and then re-evaluate the 
situation according to new climate research and the outcomes of previous 
measures.“ (DOC 9, p. 10).  
 
The Climate Council (DOC 9) considers the biggest climatic risks at stake in 
Iceland to be linked with sea-level rise, the increased intensity of precipitation, and 
ocean acidification. A range of potential solutions to adapt to these risks are 
discussed, such as revising spatial planning regulations (DOC 7, DOC 9), 
employing nature-based drainage solutions for rainwater management (DOC 7, 
DOC 9), and diversifying employment within sectors which depend upon fishing 
(DOC 9). This corresponds with Reykjavík Municipality‘s prioritization of 
identifiable risk factors that manifest themselves within distinct boundaries and the 
orientation towards solutions linked to spatial planning and the man-made 
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environment. In the accounts of both the government and Reykjavík, sea-level rise 
and precipitation become the focal objects of adaptive measures, while the range of 
conceivable solutions to deal with ocean acidification is considered to be very 
limited (DOC 5, DOC 6, DOC 9, DOC 10). However, the interview with Chairman 
of the Climate Council (DOC 10) reveals he is personally more concerned about 
global risk factors that could affect Iceland in the long-term, as the following quote 
illuminates; 
„But perhaps if you look two or three decades ahead, then I think that indirect effects of climate 
change, through devastation that occurs elsewhere, will have severe consequences here. If we 
consider this, then we must contribute more when it comes to accepting refugees and such 
things. I also think it’s inevitable that the price of food will increase. Purely because of the 
strain inflicted upon global food systems. If we are really talking about facing the facts, then 
our local problems fade in comparison with global threats.“   
 
Such global threats, or risk factors, do not feature strongly in the data but are briefly 
addressed in the discussion paper (DOC 9), where it is suggested that Icelandic 
decision-makers consider adaptation in policies which deal with food and 
immigration with regards to how climate change will potentially affect global food 
systems and refugee migration.  
 
3.2. Underlying assumptions 
3.2.1. Adaptation invites a reformist agenda 
The findings illustrate a predominant tendency towards claims that safeguard the 
integrity of a liberal economy and government, even though some moments in the 
text contradict this form of governmentality. The view that adaptation does, in fact, 
not require far-reaching changes is evident in Reykjavík‘s policies. Adaptation is 
described as „not a matter of creating new interventions, but to integrate what is 
already being done in spatial planning to prevent risk from natural phenomena“ 
(DOC 1, p. 5), and as a matter of „improving the utilization of infrastructure and 
land, improving procedures, or with other words; to do better what is already being 
done and in a more focused manner.“ (DOC 3, p. 19). The government‘s documents 
on adaptation do not invite a transformational agenda either. It is argued that a basis 
for the governance of adaptation is already present in the current systems of natural 
disaster prevention and management; they have merely not been defined as 
adaptation measures yet (DOC 9). As such, it is mostly the laws, regulations, and 
procedures related to agendas such as spatial planning and infrastructure that need 
to be changed and modified in order for adaptation to be carried out successfully in 
Iceland (DOC 9). These outcomes are, in part, to be achieved through policy 
26 
 
 
mainstreaming where synergies with other agendas are explored and adaptation is 
integrated into the existing policies (DOC 7, DOC 9). 
 
Several portrayals of Iceland as an expert in dealing with natural disasters were 
found in the material (DOC 5, DOC 6, DOC 9). It is argued that the Icelandic people 
„possess extensive and good experience when it comes to responding to natural 
disaster and the emergency it can cause“ (DOC 9, p. 8), which, supposedly, will 
come in handy when dealing with the local consequences of climate change. It is 
also posited that Iceland is likely to face less serious consequences of climate 
change, in comparison to other nations (DOC 6, DOC 9). These claims seem to be 
made to support the notion that Iceland will go a long way by simply strengthening 
current systems of natural disaster management. However, it should also be 
mentioned that some tension is present in the government‘s discourse; on the other 
hand, it is claimed that adaptation requires a „new way of thinking“ (DOC 6), that 
adaptation has the potential to reorganize, improve or even transform societal 
sectors (DOC 9) and that purely incremental approach to adaptation should be 
avoided (DOC 9). 
 
Another assumption, which seems to support the view that not much really has to 
change, is the idea that adaptation practices will seep through society if people are 
made to understand what adaptation entails and what is at stake. Both Reykjavík 
Municipality and the government stress the importance of providing information in 
order to remedy the perceived lack of knowledge about adaptation (DOC 1, DOC 
7). Furthermore, the government posits that information campaigns and education 
will increase the support for adaptation measures (DOC 7) and will turn adaptation 
into an integral part of all forms of decision-making in society (DOC 9). 
Furthermore, „mild“ solutions, or policy solutions aimed at modifying behavior, 
are presented as favorable by both Reykjavík and the government. It is posited that 
such solutions can facilitate and create incentives for decision-making in support of 
adaptation in all spheres of society (DOC 1, DOC 7, DOC 9, DOC 10). This form 
of thinking implies a market rationale, where economic motivation proves the most 
effective tool to steer change; if people are made to understand the cost of not 
adapting, then they will gravitate towards better decisions.  
 
3.2.2. Adaptation policy must be evidence-based 
The core problematization of adaptation as a matter of climate-proofing society 
through tools of risk management is founded on a technocratic mentality which 
places a strong focus upon predictive knowledge and evidence-based policy. 
Moments were also found in the text, and particularly in the work of the Climate 
Council, which presents a supplementary problematization of adaptation as a 
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sociosystemic issue. Such a problematization entails a different form of ontology, 
where it is not only external risk that becomes the object of knowledge and subject 
to change, but also society and its inherent functions and systems of governance. 
This form of thinking is implied through the inclusion of concepts such as emergent 
governance, complex systems, adaptable responses, and organizational learning 
(DOC 4, DOC 9). However, the sheer extent of technocratic conceptualizations of 
adaptation that amplify scientific risk detection found throughout the material, 
occlude such sociosystemic considerations. Ongoing claims and allusions frame 
extensive research and monitoring as the basis of all adaptation work (DOC 3, DOC 
4, DOC 8, DOC 9), which, in effect, places scientists and experts at its vanguard. 
This is well illustrated in a speech by the Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DOC 8) where he emphasizes; 1) the importance of ensuring solid 
scientific evidence about the effects of climate change in Iceland, 2) that scientific 
knowledge must be communicated with decision-makers working in the fields of 
spatial planning and construction, and 3) that the findings produced by the scientific 
community will, and must, form the basis of future measures. The Climate Council 
(DOC 9) also conceptualizes adaptation measures as the process of developing 
solutions according to the latest science and observations, arguing that the 
knowledge of risks and vulnerabilities must be in constant revision to account for 
the inherent uncertainty of climate change. This form of thinking gives rise to 
procedures informed by a feedback-loop of research, monitoring, assessment, and 
implementation where the more direct and physical effects of climate change 
become the focal point of attention.  
 
The emphasis on physical and knowable risk becomes quite apparent when looking 
into what forms of adaptation solutions are highlighted by Reykjavík Municipality 
and the Icelandic Government. As argued earlier, the bulk of proposed solutions 
address damage caused by sea-level rise, precipitation, and flooding, which are 
considered to be the most urgent risk factors to respond to in Iceland. They are also 
elements that are, arguably, quite clear, accessible and can be scientifically 
monitored locally and presented trough scientific models. Meanwhile, more 
complex and multiscalar risk factors, with boundaries that are perhaps not as easily 
defined, fall into the background. Climatic impacts on biodiversity is seen as a less 
pressing issue (DOC 3) and ocean-acidification is considered to be at the limits of 
adaptation (DOC 5, DOC 6, DOC 9, DOC 10). The interview with Reykjavík‘s 
Climate Change Commissioner (DOC 5) also supports this insight; when asked how 
solutions are prioritized she acknowledged that factors such as the increased 
intensity of precipitation are simply more „clear“ at current.  
 
Even though the dominant framing of adaptation processes involves the 
participation of scientists, politicians, and experts, the need to incorporate and 
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engage citizens is briefly mentioned in some of the material (DOC 1, DOC 9). 
Reykjavík Municipality argues that the city intends to adapt „mainly with nature-
based solutions and with the participation of citizens along with technical solutions 
when needed“  (DOC 1, p. 4). However, it is not precisely elaborated how this 
participation should take place and the notion of citizen engagement in relation to 
adaptation is either vague or non-existing in the subsequent documents. The 
Climate Council (DOC 9) also briefly touches upon the potential value of 
community-based adaptation, where consultation with communities is facilitated 
and projects initiated by citizens are promoted. Furthermore, the Climate Council 
(DOC 9) argues that social cohesion, or the sense of unity in local communities, 
can contribute to coordinated and effective responses to climate risk among people 
living in the same area. But, perhaps this is more seen as something to consider at 
later stages. The Chairman of the Climate Council (DOC 10) argues that adaptation 
is currently in its infancy as a policy issue in Iceland, and at this early stage the 
main stakeholders to involve are politicians, civil servants, scientists, and business 
representatives.   
 
Despite the strong corroboration of a pre-dominantly technocratic approach, based 
in risk-calculation and evaluation of cost, it should also be addressed that the 
Climate Council (DOC 9) does in the following passage reflect upon the limitations 
of such a model;  
„Cost is not always financial but also societal, and the definition of standards is therefore 
always a political decision even though all research and the making and interpreting of 
scenarios are aimed at being objective and scientific.“ (p. 16). 
 
Here, it is acknowledged to some extent that scientific findings are not completely 
value-free, and therefore the political dimension of decision-making should never 
be denied; even if it founded in „conclusive“ scientific evidence. The act of defining 
and assessing cost can, indeed, be carried out from a multitude of perspectives, 
considering different variables. In the quote above, it is argued that cost can, for 
example, both be financial and societal. Interestingly, this assumption is, however, 
not overtly considered in relation to power. In the same paper, the Climate Council 
(DOC 9) suggests that both private and state-run insurance companies could take 
on a leading role in assessing the value of adaptation options, with regards to 
degrees of risk, damage and cost. If this idea materializes, insurance companies 
would arguably assume a powerful role as experts in the prioritization of potential 
adaptation pathways; and this is not reflected upon. Such financialization of 
adaptation has been shown to exacerbate inequalities (Bigger et al., 2019), and lead 
to inefficient solutions (Grove, 2012). 
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3.3. Silences 
3.3.1. Systemic change 
The prevailing tendency of Icelandic policymakers to present adaptation as a matter 
of revising and adjusting current societal functions in order to increase resilience 
towards climate change devalues and obscures the notion of whether more 
fundamental changes are, in fact, needed. As such, I consider systemic change as a 
silence in the political discourse on adaptation. One dimension of this silence, is the 
economic system in place; should decision-makers not ask themselves whether its 
fundamental functions are compatible with a climate resilient and sustainable 
society? As previously discussed, liberal market discourses are often relied upon 
when claims are made about why adaptations should be carried out in certain ways, 
and this reflects a disregard for alternative solutions; be it intentional or not.   
 
3.3.2. Multiscalar and globally contingent risk factors 
The prioritization of physical and knowable risk factors that affect Iceland within 
its spatial boundaries occludes the need to develop responses to more indirect, 
multiscalar, and globally contingent risk factors. Issues such as refugee migration, 
trade disruptions, and food security are completely ignored up until the publication 
of the Climate Council‘s workshop summary in 2019 (DOC 7) and discussion paper 
in January 2020 (DOC 9), where they are briefly addressed but no concrete 
solutions are suggested. The Climate Council (DOC 9) mentions that the related 
policy agendas should be reconsidered and perhaps revised with regards to climate 
change, urging decision-makers to ask themselves whether food security should be 
ensured and whether Iceland should accept more refugees each year. Furthermore, 
the importance of increasing the adaptive capacity of eco-systems through measures 
that safeguard biodiversity is considered by Icelandic policymakers to be less 
urgent than preventing damage caused by sea-level rise and flooding; as previously 
discussed. This also suggests that climatic threats and risk factors that entail more 
complex and multiscalar systems, such as the eco-systems in the ocean that 
surrounds Iceland, are downplayed. However, this prioritization is probably also 
economically motivated, since increasing the adaptive capacity of eco-systems 
would have consequences for the economic pursuits that depend upon their 
exploitation.  
 
To further explore one dimension of this silence, I interviewed the politician who 
is currently leading the process of forming Iceland‘s first food policy, which was 
initially to be introduced by the end of 2019 (Government of Iceland, 2019) but will 
be ready sometime this year (DOC 11). It revealed that adaptation to the projected 
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effects of climate change is currently not a focal concern within this policy arena. 
Iceland‘s food policy, as elaborated by the interviewee, will mainly focus on 
promoting Icelandic produce as products of premium quality which will increase 
their appeal and market value both locally and abroad (DOC 11). Furthermore, the 
upcoming policy will not entail any major changes to agricultural subsidies, and 
therefore meat and dairy products will probably remain the mainstay of Icelandic 
food production (DOC 11). The interviewee supports this point by arguing that the 
demand for meat is, in fact, not decreasing even though the demand for plant-based 
products has seen an unprecedented rise in the last years (DOC 11). According to 
these findings, the formulation of the food policy is strongly informed by a liberal 
supply-and-demand market rationale, where the task of the government becomes to 
ensure that Icelandic agriculture is profitable and can respond to the current 
demands of the market rather than to enforce long-term solutions in response to 
issues such as climate change.     
 
3.3.3. Ontological plurality 
Technocratic and evidence-based visions of adaptation lead to a situation where it 
is seen as common-sense to place decision-making in the hands of scientists, 
experts, and politicians. This engenders the exclusion of other actors, whose 
knowledge and insights are considered less relevant, from decision-making 
processes, and as such I consider ontological plurality to be the third silence at play. 
This is highly problematic given that such exclusion can lead to an impoverished 
understanding of the issue and downplays considerations of social justice as a 
dimension of adaptation. Even though my results show that citizen participation in 
adaptation processes is somewhat addressed by Icelandic policymakers, the sheer 
extent of discourses that establish the superiority of experts obstructs such ideas.   
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4.1. Responses to knowable risk at the cost of long-
term thinking. 
The systematic distortion of adaptation policy communication has inevitably lead 
to significant moments of discursive closure. First of all, the results of this study 
strongly suggest that local and national authorities in Iceland are, and have been, 
gravitating towards adaptation pathways that prioritize the biophysical causes and 
effects of climate change. This way of „doing adaptation“ derives from the 
conceptual division of nature and society (Nightingale et al., 2020), and is deeply 
problematic since it suggests that adaptation for the benefit of society can be 
achieved through the mere detection and management of external biophysical 
threats. This form of knowledge downplays the sociosystemic dimension of 
anthropocenic climate change, suggests that social and biophysical drivers can be 
parsed and addressed separately, and fails to challenge the economic and societal 
functions that sustain the problem (ibid.). I also contend that it is harmfully 
negligent, in that it directs attention and efforts away from the more globally 
contingent and indirect effects of climate change; such as threats of severe crop 
failure, trade disruptions, social conflict, refugee migration, and health crises. 
Iceland, a small island nation of roughly 364.000 people (Statistics Iceland, 2020), 
is heavily reliant upon imported food products and other essential goods that sustain 
local production and activities (Bailes et al., 2011). The degree to which Iceland is 
exposed to global forces should hence not be understated. 
 
A growing number of scholars are highly concerned about the stress that climate 
change inflicts upon our capacity to grow and harvest food supplies (Gomez-
Zavaglia et al., 2020). If we can expect an increased intensity of droughts and 
subsequent crop failures, fish stocks that continue declining due to ocean 
acidification and overfishing, and other severe shocks to the global food systems, 
then we can scarcely begin to imagine the social conflicts, economic repercussions 
and profound disruptions that will follow. Some even go as far as contending that 
societal collapse within this century has now become inevitable (Bendell, 2019). 
4. Discussion 
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The coronavirus pandemic, which is wreaking global havoc as these words are 
written, is also a prime example of how climatic stressors lead to far-reaching and 
unforeseen outcomes. Even though pandemics have threatened human lives for 
centuries, and will continue to do so, they become more likely in the face of climate 
change and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources (Wu et al., 2016) 
and, perhaps, also more deadly when combined with severe air pollution (Wu et al., 
2020). Considering all of these alarming projections, I question why the climatic 
dimensions of social issues such as food security, immigration, and health care are 
not given more serious thought in Iceland.  
 
I do not wish to assert that Icelandic policy-makers themselves do not worry about 
the risks and effects that are mentioned here above, or consider them unimportant. 
For instance, The Chairman of The Climate Council identified the projected 
consequences for global food systems as one of the factors he is personally most 
concerned about. Rather, I suggest that a range of factors give rise to a certain 
institutional inertia. For instance, the evidence-based approaches that direct focus 
towards identifiable and physical risk can render the multifaceted issue of climate 
adaptation more governable (Nightingale et al., 2019). This pathway proposes some 
changes and reforms to the status quo, but only to the point that it can still be 
reconciled with and does not fundamentally challenge the liberal and market-
oriented governmentality in place (Remling, 2018). As such, it has the potential to 
gain traction and support among proponents of the capitalist system, but also among 
those who recognize the need for change. This is both in line with Stone‘s (1988) 
understanding of problem representation as a strategic tool to gain the favor of as 
many people as possible, and Deetz‘s (1992) notion of how discursive closures 
serve to eliminate conflict. 
 
The desire to render adaptation more manageable and compelling as a policy issue 
is also illustrated by the tendency to frame it in terms of resilience. An increasing 
number of policymakers prefer to describe adaptation in terms of socio-ecological 
resilience (Kythreotis et al., 2017), or „the ability of human communities to 
withstand external shocks and to recover” (p. 1532) since this kind of disposition 
carries the positive connotations of strength, robustness, and flexibility. Such a 
reframing of adaptation as resilience is indeed omnipresent in Icelandic policy 
discussions, as my results show. However, the term resilience is not entirely 
unproblematic. Kythreotis et al. (2017) argue that it poses a certain trap, in that it 
focuses attention towards short-term societal responses to foreseen events, such as 
flooding and other extreme weather events. Similarly, Walker et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that adaptation framed as resilience can also lead to obscure trade-offs 
between geographical locations and societal sectors where the building of resilience 
in one area erodes it elsewhere. This seems to be the case in Iceland, where 
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adaptation becomes a matter of identifying predictable shocks and hazardous 
events, prepare and strengthen local response systems and incorporate prevention 
through spatial planning and man-made infrastructure, while other considerations 
are downplayed or concealed.  
 
What I‘ve been getting at here, is that the attempts made to push the agenda of 
adaptation and help it gain political traction, come at the cost of more long-term 
thinking. However, the tendency to frame adaptation as resilience does not merely 
reflect the desire to gain political traction, but also a propensity to limit the scope 
of conceivable change; be it intentional or unwitting. Pelling (2011) argues that 
„adaptation as resilience is a form that seeks to secure the continuation of desired 
systems functions into the future in the face of changing context“ (p. 81), which is 
in line with Holling‘s (1973) conception of resilience as the extent to which systems 
can withstand external shocks and pressure without having to shift into a 
fundamentally different order. If the thresholds of the current system are exceeded, 
a fundamental regime change becomes inevitable. Provided that adaptation, then, 
becomes a matter of securing resilience so that these thresholds are not put to the 
test, it also, essentially, becomes a matter of maintaining the status quo. My findings 
correspond with this notion, demonstrating that Icelandic policy-makers, at both the 
municipal and national level, provide overt and implicit accounts of how adaptation 
is a matter of refining and improving current societal functions.  
 
4.2. Reconceptualizing adaptation as social 
transformation 
The governmentality that underpins the policymaking of Reykjavík Municipality 
and the Icelandic Government bears values that are, in essence, neoliberal and 
capitalist. This belief-system, which paves the way for strategies that deem 
systemic adjustments, economic incentives, green growth, rational-choice, and 
behavioral change as sufficient solutions, is according to Wilhite (2016) 
incompatible with a sustainable future where de-carbonization has been achieved. 
Neoliberal adaptation pathways are not only problematic in that they downplay or 
ignore the social dimensions of climate change, as my findings have shown, but 
they have also proven particularly predisposed to maladaptive effects (Remling, 
2018) and will often exacerbate social vulnerabilities and inequality (Pelling, 2011).  
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that these approaches derive from a 
scientific world-view that is fundamentally flawed. The conceptual division of 
nature and society, which steers adaptation towards technical and managerial 
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responses, entails an ontological error since it ignores the co-emergent relationship 
that exists between the two spheres (Nightingale et al. 2020). This is why the 
demand for a reconceptualization of adaptation as social transformation is 
becoming more pervasive (Pelling, 2011; Opperman, 2011; O‘Brien, 2018;  
Nightingale et al., 2020). It is clear that simply generating more and better scientific 
evidence is a substandard solution to the problem of climate change adaptation. 
What is now being called for is a model that certainly addresses the biophysical 
dimensions of climate change and presents technical solutions, but also accounts 
for sociosystemic dimensions and attends to issues such as values, power, and 
equity; which are not as easily monitored and assessed. Furthermore, such a model 
would recognize that the co-emergence of society and nature are in constant flux 
(Nightingale et al., 2020) and thus the stability of societal systems cannot be the 
primus motor for climate policy. The way adaptation is understood therefore needs 
to be extended beyond practices of external risk detection and management, and 
should rather be in line with Adger‘s (2003) conception of a „dynamic social 
process“.  
Research has shown that the neoliberal form of adaptation is generally pervasive in 
wealthier countries (Remling, 2018). Any hope to challenge a governmentality so 
omnipresent might seem forlorn, but given the climatic emergency we now face it 
is critical to find ways to re-imagine society. Even though neoliberal beliefs 
produce discursive closures that rule out alternative visions, my findings also show 
that there are moments of discursive opening that might catalyze change. These 
moments are mostly to be found within the work of the Icelandic Climate Council, 
which discusses the need for transformative change, addresses globally contingent 
social dimensions such as food security, and refugee migration and presents a 
supplementary sociosystemic framing of adaptation. Furthermore, the Chairman of 
the Climate Council acknowledges that, on a personal level, he is more concerned 
about social, indirect, and globally contingent risk factors and the effects they will 
have in Iceland rather than the external biophysical risk that current policy 
pathways aim to render knowable and remedy. The presence of a supplementary 
problematization of climate change adaptation shows that there is already some 
tension between different conceptualizations; and this demonstrates that spaces are 
opening up where the hegemony of neoliberal beliefs can be challenged 
(Opperman, 2011). 
There are certainly cracks in the system, but how is deliberate change brought 
about? Eriksen et al. (2019) describe transformation in the context of climate 
change in terms of „altering the fundamental attributes of the system, challenging 
the systems and structures, economic and social relations, and beliefs and behaviors 
that contribute to climate change and social vulnerability.“ (p. 3). This kind of 
transformation demands a rethinking of the values that underpin the way we 
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organize society, which correlates with Meadows‘s (1999) notion of how the 
mindsets and goals that propel a given system can prove the most valuable leverage 
points for change. If adaptation policies are to prioritize social justice and the long-
term wellbeing of the general public, and other living beings, over short-term 
responses to knowable risk and the maintenance of political stability, then they must 
address core values and not behaviors. O‘Brien (2018) argues that although beliefs 
and worldviews are difficult to challenge, a fundamental step in the process is to 
engage individuals as agents of change in the process of systemic transformation 
rather than seeing them as „objects to be changed“ (p. 157). This would entail 
opening up spaces for normative debate, where citizens and non-experts participate 
in the shaping of visions for the future, which correlates with what Nightingale et 
al. (2020) consider as vital in the reconceptualization of the relationship between 
society and the environment; to „make room for plurality of knowledges“ (p. 345). 
If the problem of climate change and adaptation is addressed from multiple 
viewpoints, then more opportunities to question uneven power relations and 
hegemonic assumptions present themselves; which could ultimately lead to a 
deeper understanding, more reflexive decision-making, and more just outcomes. 
Pelling et al. (2015) also support this notion and argue that transformative 
adaptation must interrogate power and render it visible. From this viewpoint, and 
as Dingler (2005) argues, it is more important that democratic processes facilitate 
open discussion and maintain the contestability of issues as opposed to generating 
agreement through argumentation. From this it follows that conflicts should not be 
downplayed and treated as roadblocks to adaptation, but rather as an essential 
dimension of the whole process; one which stimulates creativity (Christensen et al., 
2015) and addresses groundless factual claims (Dingler, 2005). 
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What this study has revealed, first and foremost, is that the adaptation pathways 
which are taking shape in Iceland are based in neoliberal assumptions that steer 
strategies towards the identification of and responses to foreseen external risk, such 
as imminent threats of sea-level rise, intensified precipitation, and flooding. While 
the importance of ensuring biophysical evidence and developing technical solutions 
should not be undermined, the core technocratic problematizations of adaptation, 
presented by both Reykjavík Municipality and the Government of Iceland, 
downplay or ignore the societal dimensions of climate change and speculate that 
successful adaptation can be achieved through modifications to the status quo. This 
is leading to a situation where long-term thinking and the consideration of more 
multiscalar and globally contingent climatic risk factors, such as crop-failures, 
trade-disruptions, civil unrest, refugee migration, and biodiversity loss, are 
sacrificed at the altar of measurable results and short-term political stability. There 
is no reason to believe that devastation that occurs elsewhere will not have severe 
effects in Iceland, especially given how dependent the country is upon imported 
food products and other goods. It is thus essential that Icelandic decision-makers 
start accounting for these issues in the development of responses and expand the 
topic of adaptation.  
 
The neoliberal governmentality, which paves the way for current ways of 
understanding and “doing” adaptation, is deeply problematic in that it leads to 
maladaptive effects, conceals power relations, exasperates social vulnerabilities, 
and fails to acknowledge how environmental and social change are entwined. It 
entails core values of individualization, competition, and economic growth in a time 
where looming climatic disaster requires that we start thinking in terms of 
community, collaboration, austerity, and compassion. The way forward, by many 
accounts, is to propel the reconceptualization of adaptation as social transformation 
and challenge the values which sustain societal and economic functions that are 
incompatible with a sustainable and climate-resilient future.  
 
The realization that society, in its current form, can and should not be salvaged in 
the face of climate change must be reached. Even though core beliefs, values, and 
mind-sets are thought to be more difficult to address and alter, than say behavior, 
5. Conclusions 
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there is reason to believe that deliberate change can be brought about. The findings 
of my study suggest that it is institutional inertia, rather than the premeditated 
efforts of certain actors, which leads to path-dependency and the exclusion of 
alternate visions. Furthermore, the policy texts and interviews I analyzed also give 
me reason to believe that there is already some tension present between the 
dominant neoliberal visions of adaptation and alternate sociosystemic framings; 
which should be recognized as a potential opening for transformation. One of the 
measures that could further catalyze change is to expand the adaptation debate to 
include a plurality of knowledges. This is based on the assumption that better results 
are achieved through the creation of situations where the interrogation of 
problematic factual and normative claims can take place and power relations are 
rendered visible. Democratic processes that allow for such contestation and 
facilitate reflexivity can, ultimately, lead to a deeper and more multifaceted 
understanding of climatic issues and pave the way for more socially just outcomes, 
which prioritize the well-being of present and future generations over short-term 
responses and political gain.  
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I met with the Climate Change Commissioner of Reykjavík municipality at the city 
offices on February 11th of 2020. The interview itself was conducted in a private 
meeting room and took around 46 minutes. The Chairman of the Icelandic Climate 
Council agreed to meet with me at a cafe on February 13th and we spoke for around 
52 minutes. Both informants gave consent for the interview to be recorded and after 
they had been conducted, I transcribed and translated them from Icelandic into 
English. The third interview, with the politician who is leading the process of 
formulating Iceland’s first food policy, was not recorded and took place in a café 
on February 21st.  
 
 
 
Interview guide 
 
For the semi-structured interviews with Reykjavík’s Climate Commissioner (DOC 
5) and the Chairman of the Icelandic Climate Council (DOC 11), I prepared and 
addressed the following interview topics: 
 
 Professional role: What are your main tasks and responsibilities in relation 
to climate adaptation? 
 Problem representation: How is climate adaptation best defined? What 
are the biggest potential threats that climate change poses to Reykjavík or 
Iceland? If possible at all, how are we to prepare and prevent these potential 
risks? Which actions and responses should be prioritized and why are they 
important? 
 Knowledge and information: Where does Reykjavík municipality or the 
Climate Council retrieve information about climate change and adaptation?  
 
 
For the semi-structured interview with the politician who is leading the 
formulation of Iceland‘s upcoming food policy (DOC 11), I prepared and 
addressed the following interview topics: 
 
 Professional role: What are your main tasks and responsibilities in relation 
to Iceland‘s food policy? 
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 Content of the upcoming food policy: What will the upcoming food policy 
entail – what are the focal points and why are they important? Can you share 
any concrete solutions/actions that it entails? 
 Future vision for Icelandic agriculture: Why is the government forming 
a food policy now (and not earlier)? What changes, if any, does the 
upcoming food policy seek to bring about? Will it entail changes to 
agricultural subsidies or other reforms? 
 Practical aspects: When will Iceland‘s food policy be finalized? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
